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ESSAY

FOCUSING ON HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY
RATHER THAN LEGAL PERSONHOOD FOR
NONHUMAN ANIMALS
RICHARD L. CUPP, JR.**
We should focus on human legal accountability for
responsible treatment of nonhuman animals rather than
radically restructuring our legal system to make them legal


This essay corresponds with two briefs by Steve Wise and Professor Larry
Tribe. These briefs are published on PELR’s website: Steve Wise & Elizabeth
Stein, Memorandum of Law in Support of Petition for Habeas Corpus, 33 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 542 (2016) (brief originally filed in Nonhuman Rights Project,
Inc. v. Lavery, No. 162358/2015 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015)); Laurence H. Tribe, Letter
Brief of Amicus Curiae Laurence H. Tribe in Support of Motion for Leave to
Appeal, 33 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 661 (2016) (letter-brief originally filed in People
ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 38 N.E.3d 828 (N.Y. 2015) (No.
2015-293)).
** John W. Wade Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. I
thank the PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW and Steven Wise for inviting me to
write this essay, and the Pepperdine University School of Law for providing a
research grant in support of this essay and other publications. Thank you also to
Jodi Kruger, Natalie Lagunas, and Samantha Parrish for providing consistently
outstanding research assistance, to Naomi Goodno, David Han, Barry
McDonald, and Robert Pushaw for providing feedback on a draft of this essay;
and Justin Beck and Mark Scarberry for their thoughts and input regarding
animal legal personhood. The input and assistance these individuals have
graciously provided me do not necessarily reflect agreement with any or all of
this Article’s theses. Most or much of this essay was also published addressing a
previous manifestation of the lawsuit in Richard L. Cupp Jr., Human
Responsibility, Not Legal Personhood, for Nonhuman Animals, 16 ENGAGE 34,
38 (2015). Both essays draw heavily from the author’s comments in Animal
Personhood:
A
Debate,
http://www.fed-soc.org/multimedia/detail/animalpersonhood-a-debate-event-audiovideo, and both essays are largely excerpted
from a more thorough article, Cognitively Impaired Humans, Intelligent
Animals, and Legal Personhood, which will be made available at SSRN.com.
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persons.1 This essay, provided at the kind invitation of the Pace
Environmental Law Review and Steven Wise, President of the
Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc.,2 outlines a number of concerns
about animal legal personhood. It does so primarily in the context
of the plaintiff’s brief in The Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v.
Lavery, filed in the New York Supreme Court, New York County.3
The first Lavery lawsuit (Lavery I) was filed in Fulton County in
late 2013.4 After Lavery I was dismissed at the trial court and
appellate levels, the second Lavery lawsuit (Lavery II) was filed in
New York County in late 2015. The Pace Environmental Law
Review is publishing a memorandum of law by Steve Wise and
Elizabeth Stein in support of the petition for habeas corpus in
Lavery II5 along with an amicus brief by Professor Laurence
Tribe6 supporting the the appeal of Lavery I and this essay
opposing the lawsuit.
The arguments plaintiffs provide in their Lavery I brief and
in their Lavery II brief feature many similar themes, but this
essay will focus primarily on the language of the Lavery II brief,
as it is the more recent. As with Lavery I, the Lavery II brief
1. For the sake of brevity I will hereafter refer to nonhuman animals as
“animals.”
2. Hereafter “NhRP.”
3. Memorandum of Law in Support of Petition for Habeas Corpus,
Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, No. 162358/2015 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015),
http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Memo-ofLaw-Dec-2-2015.pdf[https://perma.cc/CM7V-P7US] [hereinafter Lavery II Brief].
The lower court dismissed the lawsuit, and the Nonhuman Rights Project has
indicated it will file an appeal. See New York Trial Court Denies Tommy’s
Second Bid for Freedom, NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT (Jan. 7, 2016),
http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2016/01/07/new-york-court-deniestommys-bid-for-freedom/ [https://perma.cc/7DJH-LH4Y].
4. See Petitioner’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Order to Show Cause
& Writ of Habeas Corpus & Order Granting the Immediate Release of Tommy,
Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 2014 N.Y. Slip Op 77524(U) (2014)
(No. 518336), http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/
12/Memorandum-of-Law-Tommy-Case.pdf
[https://perma.cc/94RU-VC83]
[hereinafter Lavery I Brief].
5. Lavery II Brief, supra note 3. This will be published on PELR’s website at
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/.
6. Letter Brief of Amicus Curiae Laurence H. Tribe in Support of Motion for
Leave to Appeal, People ex. rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, No.
518336/2015, (N.Y. 2015)
[hereinafter Tribe Letter Brief], http://
www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/7.-Exhibit-6Tribe-Amicus-Curiae-Letter-Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4JY-NJ5T].
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seeks a common law writ of habeas corpus for a chimpanzee
named Tommy that was kept in upstate New York by a private
individual.7 As with Lavery I, the Lavery II brief does not claim
that any existing laws are being violated in the chimpanzee’s
treatment. Rather, both the Lavery I and Lavery II briefs argue
that the chimpanzee is entitled to legal personhood under liberty
and equality principles.8 The Lavery II brief specifically asserts
that he “possesses dozens of complex cognitive abilities that
comprise and support his autonomy and bodily liberty. Moreover,
he can shoulder duties and responsibilities both within
chimpanzee societies and within human/chimpanzee societies.”9
As with Lavery I, the Lavery II brief also asserts that Tommy is
entitled to legal personhood under a New York statute allowing
humans to create inter vivos trusts for the care of animals.10
Both Lavery briefs seek to have the chimpanzee moved to a
sanctuary that confines chimpanzees, but in a manner the briefs
argue is preferable to the chimpanzee’s living situation when the
lawsuits were filed.11
The NhRP has filed several closely related lawsuits seeking
legal personhood for chimpanzees, including Lavery I and Lavery
II, in New York since late 2013.12 As of the writing of this essay,
7. See Lavery II Brief, supra note 3. The Nonhuman Rights Project reported
in February 2016 that Tommy had been moved to a “roadside zoo” in Michigan.
See Lauren Choplin, Update: Tommy, NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, (Feb. 16,
2016),
http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2016/02/12/update-tommy/
[https://perma.cc/BPG5-HBAD].
8. Lavery II Brief, supra note 3, at 102–10; Lavery I Brief, supra note 4, at
55–77.
9. Lavery II Brief, supra note 3, at 113; see also Lavery I Brief, supra note 4,
at 77 (“Tommy is possessed of autonomy, self-determination, self-awareness,
and the ability to choose how to live his life, as well as dozens of complex
cognitive abilities that comprise and support his autonomy.”).
10. Lavery II Brief, supra note 3, at 110–14; see also Lavery I Brief, supra
note 4, at 49–52.
11. Lavery II Brief, supra note 3, at 6; Lavery I Brief, supra note 4, at 1.
12. People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project v. Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d 248
(App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2015); Nonhuman Rights Project v. Presti, 999 N.Y.S.2d 652
(App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2015); Nonhuman Rights Project v. Stanley, 16 N.Y.S.3d
898 (Sup. Ct. 2015); Order to Show Cause &Writ of Habeas Corpus, Nonhuman
Rights Project v. Presti, No. 150149/2016, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 29, 2016),
http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Decision-ofJustice-Jaffe-dated-1.29.16.pdf [https://perma.cc/784U-3DRX]; Order to Show
Cause & Writ of Habeas Corpus, Nonhuman Rights Project v. Lavery, No.
162358 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 23, 2015), https://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/fbem/
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all of the courts making decisions on the cases have rejected
them.13 By the author’s count, at least twenty-three New York
judges have participated in ruling against the lawsuits thus far.14
A cursory history of the Lavery I and Lavery II lawsuits may
be helpful for understanding the context of the Lavery II brief.
After first being rejected by the Fulton County Supreme Court,
Lavery I was again rejected by a unanimous five-judge panel of
the New York State Supreme Court Appellate Division, Third
Judicial Department, in People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project,
Inc. v. Lavery.15 In the Lavery I decision, the court emphasized
that “collectively, human beings possess the unique ability to bear
legal responsibility.”16
The NhRP filed a motion for leave to appeal to the Court of
Appeals of the State of New York,17 but the Court denied the
DocumentDisplayServlet?documentId=2FAAP/keZ_PLUS_ptiKc1FQrdhQ==&sy
stem=prod [https://perma.cc/M6H9-JQZZ] [hereinafter Order to Show Cause &
Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dec. 23, 2015)].
In December 2015 the lower court dismissed Lavery II, and the
Nonhuman Rights Project has indicated it will file an appeal. See New York
Trial Court Denies Tommy’s Second Bid for Freedom, supra note 3. In January
2016, shortly after the dismissal of the Lavery II case, the Nonhuman Rights
Project filed its most recent lawsuit. This one involves the same parties named
in the Presti case, but was instead filed in New York County. See NhRP Re-Files
Habeas Corpus Case on Behalf of Kiko in New York, NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT
(Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2016/01/12/nhrp-re-fileshabeas-corpus-case-on-behalf-of-kiko-in-new-york/
[https://perma.cc/GZS4ZM8M]. A trial court judge dismissed this most recent lawsuit in January 2016,
and the NhRP has indicated it will appeal. See New York Supreme Court Judge
Denies Kiko’s Second Habeas Corpus Bid, NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT (Feb. 11,
2016), http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2016/02/11/new-york-trial-courtdenies-kikos-latest-habeas-corpus-bid/ [https://perma.cc/ZCV7-4HLQ].
13. See supra note 12.
14. This includes one lower court judge each for Lavery I and the first Presti
lawsuit, two lower court judges for the Stanley lawsuit (one of these judges,
Justice Barbara Jaffe, dismissed three of the lawsuits: Stanley, Lavery II, and
the second Presti lawsuit), five unanimous intermediate appellate judges each
for the Lavery and Presti lawsuits, four intermediate appellate judges for the
Stanley lawsuit, and at least five judges of the New York Court of Appeals in its
decision denying the NhRP’s motion to appeal the intermediate appellate
rulings in Lavery I and in the first Presti lawsuit.
15. People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project v. Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d 248
(App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2014).
16. Id. at 251 n.3.
17. Motion for Leave to Appeal & Affirmation in Support, Nonhuman Rights
Project, Inc. v. Lavery, No. 518336/2015 (N.Y. App. Div. Feb. 23, 2015)
http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/6.-Motion-
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motion in September 2015.18 The NhRP then filed Lavery II in
New York County, providing additional expert affidavits and
arguing that the Third Department’s appellate decision in Lavery
I was wrongly decided.19 The trial court dismissed Lavery II in
December 2015, writing only that it “[d]eclined, to the extent that
the Third Dept. determined the legality of Tommy’s detention, an
issue best addressed there, [and] absent any allegation or ground
that is sufficiently distinct from those set forth in the first
petition.”20 The NhRP has indicated that it will appeal this
decision.21
Although the NhRP has not yet succeeded in making animals
legal persons in either Lavery case or any other lawsuits, these
for-Leave-to-Appeal-and-Affirmation-in-Support.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GC2QSPJR].
18. People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 38 N.E.3d 828
(N.Y. 2015). On the same day, the New York Court of Appeals also denied a
motion to appeal the intermediate appellate court decision in Presti. See
Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Kiko v. Presti, 38 N.E.3d 827 (N.Y. 2015).
19. Lavery II Brief, supra note 3, at 72–85.
20. Order to Show Cause & Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dec. 23, 2015), supra
note 12, at 2.
21. See New York Trial Court Denies Tommy’s Second Bid for Freedom, supra
note 3. The trial court judge who dismissed Lavery II, Justice Barbara Jaffe,
previously rejected the Stanley lawsuit that was also filed in New York County.
Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Hercules & Leo v. Stanley, 16 N.Y.S.3d
898, 918 (Sup. Ct. 2015). In rejecting Stanley, she found the Lavery I appellate
decision to be controlling under stare decisis, and she indicated that the issue
should be left to the legislature or to the New York Court of Appeals. Id. at 914–
17. Although the ruling emphasized that the law may evolve and took a
sympathetic tone with some of the NhRP’s positions without highlighting some
of the serious problems with the lawsuit, it did not advocate for animal legal
personhood. See id. at 918. Rather, the decision in vague dicta seemed to imply
support more generally for further consideration of the issue without staking out
a position. See id. In further dicta, the decision expressly rejected using the past
mistreatment of slaves, women, and other humans as an analogy for extending
legal personhood to animals. Id. at 912. The NhRP has filed an appeal with the
First Department. Notice of Appeal Filed in Hercules and Leo Case, NONHUMAN
RIGHTS PROJECT (Aug. 20, 2015), http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2015/
08/20/notice-of-appeal-filed-in-hercules-and-leo-case/
[https://perma.cc/9MP7FJB7]. Later, in January 2016, Justice Jaffe also rejected the second Presti
lawsuit. See Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Presti, No. 150149/2016 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/01/Decision-of-Justice-Jaffe-dated-1.29.16.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
784U-3DRX]. Many of the legal documents associated with the chimpanzee
lawsuits are available online. See Court Cases, NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT,
http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/category/courtfilings/ [https://perma.cc/
LB6G-4GTT].
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lawsuits are only the beginning of a long-term struggle, and the
issue’s ultimate outcome is far from clear. Although the lawsuits
are misguided in many ways, they should not be underestimated.
The question of how we treat animals is exceptionally serious,
both for animals and for human morality.22 The emotional
appeal of doing something very dramatic in an effort to help
animals, especially the animals that are most like us, is
understandably strong to many people. This essay encourages
greater empathy for animals, but introduces and briefly outlines
several problems with the lawsuits and calls instead for a focus
on evolving standards of human responsibility for animals’
welfare as a means of protecting animals rather than granting
legal personhood to animals.23
I.

ANIMAL LEGAL PERSONHOOD AS PROPOSED
IN THE LAVERY LAWSUITS WOULD POSE
THREATS TO THE MOST VULNERABLE HUMANS

A danger that is underestimated and far out on the horizon
may be more likely to advance from threat to harm than a similar
danger that is immediate and clearly seen. One of the most
serious concerns about legal personhood for intelligent animals is
that it presents an unintended, long-term, and perhaps not
immediately obvious threat to humans—particularly to the most
vulnerable humans.
Among the most vulnerable humans are people with
cognitive impairments24 that may give them no capacity for
autonomy or less capacity for autonomy than some animals,
whether because of age (such as in infancy), intellectual
disabilities, or other reasons.25
To be clear, supporting
22. As recognized by Immanuel Kant, “[H]e who is cruel to animals becomes
hard also in his dealings with men.” IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 240
(Louis Infield trans., Harper Torchbooks 1963) (1780).
23. This essay does not undertake to address all problems with the lawsuits.
24. This essay will use the term “cognitive impairments” to refer to all
human cognitive limitations, including those related to childhood and
intellectual disabilities, as well as being comatose or being impaired due to an
injury, illness, or medical condition.
25. See Richard L. Cupp Jr., Cognitively Impaired Humans, Intelligent
Animals,
and
Legal
Personhood,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/
AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=543387 (forthcoming); Richard L. Cupp Jr., Children,
Chimps, and Rights Arguments from “Marginal” Cases, 45 AZ. ST. L. J. 1 (2013)
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personhood based on animals’ intelligence does not imply that one
wants to reduce the protections afforded humans with cognitive
impairments. Indeed, my understanding is that the Lavery briefs
seek to pull smart animals up in legal consideration, rather than
to push humans with cognitive impairments down.26
However, despite these good intentions, there should be deep
concern that over a long horizon, allowing animal legal
personhood based on cognitive abilities could unintentionally lead
to gradual erosion of protections for these especially vulnerable
humans. The sky would not immediately fall if courts started
treating chimpanzees as persons. As noted above, that is part of
the challenge in recognizing the danger. But, over time, both the
courts and society might be tempted not only to view the most
intelligent animals more like we now view humans but also to
view the least intelligent humans more like we now view animals.
Professor Laurence Tribe has expressed concern that the
approach to legal personhood set forth in a much-discussed book
by Steven M. Wise might be harmful for humans with cognitive
impairments. The book, Rattling the Cage, was published in 2000,
[hereinafter Children & Chimps], for an in-depth discussion of the implications
of cognitive impairments for young children and other humans.
26. The Lavery I brief states:
Homo sapiens membership has been laudably designated a sufficient
condition for legal personhood. Even the permanently comatose and
anencephalic of our species, humans are entitled to fundamental
legal rights under international and American law. However, “the
thesis that humans should be ascribed rights simply for being
human has received practically no support from philosophers.”
Lavery I Brief, supra note 4, at 70 (citation omitted) (quoting Daniel Wikler,
Concepts of Personhood: A Philosophical Perspective, in DEFINING HUMAN LIFE:
MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 12, 19 (Margery W. Shaw & A.
Edward Doudera eds., 1983). The Lavery I brief later states:
The NhRP agrees that humans who have never been sentient nor
conscious nor possessed of a brain should have basic legal rights. But
if humans bereft of autonomy, self-determination, sentience,
consciousness, even a brain, are entitled to personhood and legal
rights, then this Court must either recognize Tommy’s just equality
claim to bodily liberty or reject equality entirely.
Lavery I Brief, supra note 4, at 73. The Lavery II brief has a virtually identical
quote as well. Lavery II Brief, supra note 3, at 109 (“Humans who have never
been sentient or conscious or possessed of a brain should have basic legal rights.
But if humans bereft even of sentience are entitled to personhood, then this
Court must either recognize Tommy’s just equality claim to bodily liberty or
reject equality.”).
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and it broke new ground in setting forth arguments for intelligent
animal legal personhood directed at a popular audience.;27 In
2001 Professor Tribe stated “enormous admiration for [Mr.
Wise’s] overall enterprise and approach,” but cautioned:
[o]nce we have said that infants and very old people with
advanced Alzheimer’s and the comatose have no rights unless we
choose to grant them, we must decide about people who are
three-quarters of the way to such a condition. I needn’t spell it
out, but the possibilities are genocidal and horrific and
reminiscent of slavery and of the holocaust. 28

Mr. Wise later responded in part: “I argue that a realistic or
practical autonomy is a sufficient, not a necessary, condition for
legal rights. Other grounds for entitlement to basic rights may
exist.”29 But Mr. Wise also noted that, in his view, entitlements
to rights cannot be based only on being human.30 I did not find in
the Lavery briefs an explanation of why, despite Mr. Wise’s
apparent view, that being part of the human community is not
alone sufficient for personhood; he and the NhRP think courts
should recognize personhood in someone like a permanently
comatose infant. If the argument is that the permanently
comatose infant has rights based on dignity interests, but that
dignity is not grounded in being a part of the human community,
why would this proposed alternative basis for personhood only
apply to humans and to particularly intelligent animals? Would
all animals capable of suffering, regardless of their level of
intelligence, be entitled to personhood based on dignity? If a
rights-bearing but permanently comatose infant is not capable of
suffering, would even animals that are not capable of suffering be
27. STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE (2000).
28. Laurence H. Tribe, Ten Lessons our Constitutional Experience Can Teach
us About the Puzzle of Animal Rights: The Work of Steven M. Wise, 7 ANIMAL L.
1, 7 (2001). Thank you to Justin Beck for highlighting this passage to me in
conversation and in his presently unpublished paper addressing animal
personhood issues. Justin Beck, The Gradual Move Toward Nonhuman
Personhood: Assessing the Moral and Legal Implications of the New Animal
Rights Movement 28–29, 54 (copy on file with author).
29. Steven M. Wise, Rattling the Cage Defended, 43 B.C. L. REV.. 623, 650
(2002).
30. Id. at 650–51. I disagree with Mr. Wise and believe that treating humans
distinctively makes sense because the human community is in fact distinctive in
important aspects. See infra notes 32–59 and accompanying text.
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entitled to dignity-based personhood under this position?31 The
implications of some alternative non-cognitive approach to
personhood that rejects drawing any lines related to humanity
may be exceptionally expansive and problematic.
Further, good intentions do not prevent harmful
consequences. Regardless of the NhRP’s views and desires
regarding the rights of cognitively impaired humans, going down
the path of connecting individual cognitive abilities to personhood
would encourage us as a society to think increasingly about
individual cognitive ability when we think about personhood.
Over the course of many years, this changed paradigm could
gradually erode our enthusiasm for some of the protections
provided to humans who would not fare well in a mental
capacities analysis. Deciding chimpanzees are legal persons based
on the cognitive abilities we have seen in them may open a door
that swings in both directions regarding rights for humans as
well as for animals, and later generations may well wish we had
kept it closed.32

31. In his book DRAWING THE LINE, Mr. Wise seems to argue that under
equality principles, granting rights to a “baby born into a permanent vegetative
state” or to a man with an IQ of ten supports granting rights to what he
describes as “Category 2” animals in terms of autonomy values. See STEVEN M.
WISE, DRAWING THE LINE: SCIENCE AND THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 238 (2002).
In Category 2, he includes animals such as dogs, African Elephants, and African
Grey Parrots, which are known to probably have relatively strong intelligence.
Id. at 241. He also asserts that, with animals that are lower on the probability
scale of practical autonomy, there is a point at which the disparities in
autonomy between the animals and a man with very low intelligence “become
small enough to allow a judge to distinguish rationally between that creature
and a severely [mentally disabled] man. At some point, the psychological and
political barriers to equality for a nonhuman animal with a low autonomy value
become insuperable.” Id. at 238. But what if we consider the baby born into a
permanent vegetative state instead of an adult with a severe cognitive disability
(who may, despite his disability, have some abilities)? Would an equality
argument based on individual autonomy, if accepted, suggest personhood for
many, many more animal species that may have autonomy equal to or less than
that of an adult with a severe cognitive disability but more autonomy than that
of an infant born into a permanently vegetative state? In light of our recognition
of the legal personhood of an infant born into a permanently vegetative state,
how many (or how few) animals would not merit personhood if an equality
argument based on individual autonomy were accepted?
32. Regarding a possible misconception that acknowledging personhood’s
foundation in a societal framework of rights and responsibilities could somehow
be a threat to humans without the capacity for responsibility, see infra Part III.
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II. APPLAUDING AN EVOLVING FOCUS ON HUMAN
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANIMAL WELFARE
RATHER THAN THE RADICAL APPROACH OF
ANIMAL LEGAL PERSONHOOD
When addressing animal legal personhood, the proper
question is not whether our laws should evolve or remain
stagnant. Our legal system will evolve regarding animals and
indeed is already in a period of significant change. One major
reason for this evolution is our shift from an agrarian society to
an urban and suburban society. Until well into the twentieth
century, most Americans lived in rural areas. Most American
families owned or encountered livestock and farm animals whose
utility was economic.
Now we are an urban and suburban society, and relatively
few of us are directly involved in owning animals for economic
utility. Rather, when most of us now encounter living animals,
they are most frequently companion animals kept for emotional
utility. Most of us view the animals in our lives as in terms of
affection rather than as financial assets. As law gradually reflects
changes in society, transformation in our routine interactions
with animals doubtless has influenced the trend toward providing
them more protections in many respects.
A second major reason we are evolving in our legal
treatment of animals is the advancement of scientific
understanding about animals. We are continually learning more
about animals’ minds and capabilities. As we have gained more
understanding of animals, we have generally evolved toward
developing more compassion for them, and this increasing
compassion has been, to some extent, and will continue to be,
increasingly reflected in our protection laws.33
This evolution is a good thing, and it is probably still closer
to its initial significant acceleration in the twentieth century than
it is to a point where it will slow down. In other words, it seems
quite probable that we will continue in a period of notable change
33. These bases for changing attitudes toward animal protection are also
addressed in Richard L. Cupp Jr., Animals as More Than “Mere Things,” But
Still Property”: A Call for Continuing Reform of the Animal Welfare Paradigm,
CINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) [hereinafter “More Than Mere Things”], for a
discussion on these bases for changing attitudes toward animal protection.
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in our treatment of animals for some time. We will continue
evolving; the only question is how we should evolve.
Two unsatisfactory positions and a centrist position may be
identified in answering this question. One unsatisfactory position
would be clinging to the past and denying that we need any
changes regarding how our laws treat animals. A second
unsatisfactory position on the other extreme would be to radically
reshape our understanding of legal personhood, with potentially
dangerous consequences.
A centrist alternative to these extremes involves
maintaining our legal focus on human responsibility for how we
treat animals, but applauding changes to provide additional
protection where appropriate. As emphasized by the Third
Department in unanimously dismissing the NhRP’s Lavery
appeal: “[o]ur rejection of a rights paradigm for animals does not,
however, leave them defenseless.”34 When our laws or their
enforcement do not go far enough to prevent animals from being
mistreated, we should change our laws or improve their
enforcement rather than assert that animals are legal persons.
III. AMONG BEINGS OF WHICH WE ARE AWARE,
APPROPRIATE LEGAL PERSONHOOD IS
ANCHORED ONLY IN THE HUMAN MORAL
COMMUNITY
As explained by the philosopher Carl Cohen, “[a]nimals
cannot be the bearers of rights because the concept of right is
essentially human; it is rooted in the human moral world and has
force and applicability only within that world.”35
Our society and government are based on the ideal of moral
agents coming together to create a system of rules that entail
both rights and duties. Being generally subject to legal duties and
bearing rights are foundations of our legal system because they
are foundations of our entire form of government.
We stand together with the ideal of a social compact, or one
might call it a moral community, to uphold all of our rights,

34. People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d 248,
251 (Sup. Ct. 2014).
35. CARL COHEN & TOM REGAN, THE ANIMAL RIGHTS DEBATE 30 (2001).
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including our inalienable rights.36 As stated in the Declaration of
Independence, “to secure these rights, governments are instituted
among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed.”37 One would be hard-pressed to convince most
Americans that this is not important, as from childhood
Americans learn it as a bedrock of our social structure. It is not
surprising that the American Bar Association’s section
addressing civil liberties was, until 2015, called “The Section of
Individual Rights and Responsibilities.”38
This does not require viewing every specific protection of a
right as corresponding to a specific duty imposed on an
individual. The connection between rights and duties for
personhood is in some aspects broader and more foundational
than that. It comes first in the foundations of our society, rather
than solely in analysis of specific obligations and rights for
persons governed by our laws. As the norm, we insist that
persons in our community of humans and human proxies be
subjected to responsibilities along with holding rights, regardless
of whether a specific right or limitation requires or does not
require a specific duty to go along with it.
It misses the point to argue, as the NhRP seems to do in the
Lavery II brief, that personhood is unrelated to duties because
bodily liberty is an immunity right that does not require
capacity.39 First, as noted elsewhere in this section, this is too
36. Of course, we have in some instances shamefully failed to follow this
ideal, such as in allowing the odious institution of slavery. Because noncitizen
humans, even noncitizen unlawful enemy combatants, are human, recognizing
some rights for them is consistent with our foundational societal principles. We
assert some responsibilities for noncitizens as they interact with our society in
addition to recognizing that they have some rights as they interact with our
society. See infra note 72.
37. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
38. See ABA H.D. 11-2 (2015), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
directories/policy/2015_hod_annual_meeting_11-2.docx [https://perma.cc/FY2NGVSK] (explaining that the name was being changed from the Section of
Individual Rights and Responsibilities to the Section of Civil Rights and Social
Justice because “[t]he Section's activities have always been grounded in
Constitutional rights and principles, but have expanded beyond that,” leading to
confusion regarding the section’s focus).
39. Lavery II Brief, supra note 3, at 80–81. Professor Hohfeld was also
invoked in the plaintiff’s appeal of the Lavery I appellate decision. See
Memorandum of Law in Support of Appellant’s Motion for Leave to Appeal to
the Court of Appeals at 19–20, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 998
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narrow a conceptualization of connections between rights and
duties. Further, whether freedom from slavery requires capacity
does not control the question of personhood, since cognitively
impaired humans’ personhood is anchored in the responsible
community of humans, even if they cannot make responsible
choices themselves. The NhRP’s argument does not avoid the
problem that a chimpanzee, although an impressive being we
need to treat with exceptional thoughtfulness, should not be
considered a person within our intrinsically human legal system,
whereas humans with cognitive limitations should be recognized
as persons.
Professor Wesley Hohfeld wrote about the form of rights and
duties between persons in the early twentieth century, and the
NhRP’s Lavery II brief seeks to invoke his analysis to argue for
chimpanzee legal personhood.40 Perhaps the most basic problem
with the NhRP’s argument is that we are dealing with a question
that must precede the Hohfeldian analysis of the forms of rights
granted to persons. Professor Hohfeld’s description of rights
assumed it was dealing with the rights of persons.41 Our issue
revolves around who is a member of society eligible for those
rights and protections; in other words, who is a person. This is a
foundational question that is not answered by Hohfeldian
analysis.42
It is sometimes asserted that since we give corporations
personhood, justice requires that we should give personhood to

N.Y.S.2d
248
(App.
Div.
2015)
(No.
518336/2015),
http://
www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/6.-Motion-forLeave-to-Appeal-and-Affirmation-in-Support.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TW4Y9HLT].
40. Lavery II Brief, supra note 3, at 80–81.
41. Professor Hohfeld stated, “[S]ince the purpose of the law is to regulate the
conduct of human beings, all jural relations must, in order to be clear and direct
in their meaning, be predicated of such human beings.” Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26
YALE L.J. 710, 721 (1917).
42. “[S]ince Hohfeld's theory is largely descriptive, it does not really tell us
what grounds our duties and, thus, what ultimately grounds rights. While
Hohfeld's theory may help us to identify and explicate legal issues, it is not a
method for determining social and legal philosophical issues.” Thomas G. Kelch,
The Role of the Rational and the Emotive in a Theory of Animal Rights, 27 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 9 (1999).
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intelligent animals.43 However, this argument ignores that
corporations are created by humans as a proxy for the rights and
duties of their human stakeholders.44 They are simply a vehicle
for addressing human interests and obligations.45
The Lavery II brief argues that “if humans bereft even of
sentience are entitled to personhood, then this Court must either
recognize Tommy’s just equality claim to bodily liberty or reject
equality.”46 The Lavery I brief similarly argues that “if humans
bereft of autonomy, self-determination, sentience, consciousness,
even a brain, are entitled to personhood and legal rights, then
this Court must either recognize Tommy’s just equality claim to
Although not
bodily liberty or reject equality entirely.”47
described as such in the Lavery I or Lavery II briefs, reasoning
along these lines is often referred to by philosophers as “the
argument from marginal cases.”48
The concept of an “argument from marginal cases” has an
unsettling tone, because most of us do not want to think of any
humans as being “marginal.”49 The pervasive view that all
humans have distinctive and intrinsic human dignity regardless
of their capabilities may have cultural, religious, or even
instinctual foundations.
All of these foundations would on their own present huge
challenges for animal legal personhood arguments to overcome in
the real world of law, but they are not the only reasons to reject
the arguments. Humans with cognitive impairments are a part of
society’s community, even if their own agency is limited or
nonexistent. Among the beings of which we are presently aware,
humans are the only ones for whom the norm is capacity for
moral agency sufficiently strong to function within our society’s
legal system of rights and responsibilities. Further, it may be
added that no other beings of which we are presently aware living
43. Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Moving Beyond Animal Rights: A
Legal/Contractualist Critique, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 27, 51 (2009).
44. Id. at 52–53.
45. See id. at 52–63 (analyzing the history of corporate personhood being
consistently defined as a proxy for human interests under all major theories
seeking to explain corporate personhood).
46. Lavery II Brief, supra note 3, at 109.
47. Lavery I Brief, supra note 4, at 73.
48. See Children & Chimps, supra note 25, at 22–28.
49. Id. at 28–29.
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today (even, for example, the most intelligent of all chimpanzees)
ever meet that norm. Recognizing personhood in our fellow
humans regardless of whether they meet the norm is a pairing of
like “kind” where the “kind” category has special significance—
the significance of the norm being the only creatures who can
rationally participate as members of a society subject to a legal
system such as ours.
Morally autonomous humans have unique natural bonds
with other humans who have cognitive impairments, and thus
denying rights to them also harms the interests of society—we
are all in a community together. Infants are human infants and
adults with severe cognitive impairments are humans who are
other humans’ parents, siblings, children or spouses.
We have all been children and we relate to children in a
special way. Further, we all know that we could develop cognitive
impairments ourselves at some point in our lives, and this
reminds us that humanity is the most defining characteristic of
persons with cognitive impairments.
Thus, recognizing that personhood is anchored in the human
moral world does not imply that humans with cognitive
impairments are not persons or have no rights. As explained by
Professor Cohen, “[t]his criticism . . . mistakenly treats the
essentially moral feature of humanity as though it were a screen
for sorting humans, which it most certainly is not.”50 It would be
a serious misperception to view the appellate court’s decision in
Lavery as actually threatening to infants and others with severe
cognitive impairments in finding connections between rights and
duties. This misperception would reflect an overly narrow view of
how rights and duties are connected.
Regarding personhood, they are connected with human
society in general, rather than on an individual-by-individual
capacities analysis.51 Again, appropriate legal personhood is
anchored in the human moral community, and we include
humans with severe cognitive impairments in that community
because they are first and foremost humans living in our

50. COHEN & REGAN, supra note 35, at 37.
51. Of course, individual capacities are relevant to some specific rights (for
example, the right to vote). They are not relevant to humans’ personhood.

15

CUPP

532

- FINAL

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

5/4/2016 7:43 PM

[Vol. 33

society.52 Indeed, the history of legal rights for children and for
cognitively impaired humans is a history of emphasis on their
humanity.53 The Lavery court noted that “[t]o be sure, some
humans are less able to bear legal duties or responsibilities than
others. These differences do not alter our analysis, as it is
undeniable that, collectively, human beings possess the unique
ability to bear legal responsibility.”54

52. Further, the status quo views humans as persons based on their
humanity, and infants and other cognitively impaired persons are
unquestionably included. It is rejecting this status quo in favor of an approach
that denies membership in the human community as the foundation for
personhood that would create risk for cognitively impaired humans, not
maintaining the status quo.
53. See RICHARD FARSON, BIRTHRIGHTS: A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN 1
(1978) (asserting that denying rights to children denies “their right to full
humanity”).
54. People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d 248,
251 n.3 (Sup. Ct. 2014). . In Professor Tribe’s Amicus Curiae Letter Brief in
support of NhRP’s motion for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals,
he raises two common theoretical conceptualizations of the function of human
rights that are debated by academic philosophers and other theorists: the
“interest theory” and the “will theory.” Tribe Letter Brief, supra note 6, at 8–10.
The will theory “asserts that the function of a right is to give its holder control
over another's duty.” Leif Wenar, Rights, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY § 2.2 (Edward N. Zaita ed., 2015), http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/rights/#2.2 [https://perma.cc/JK87-9SN6]. The interest theory maintains
that “the function of a right is to further the right-holder's interests.” Id.
Philosophers and other academicians have squabbled over whether one of these
theories provides a better accounting of the function of rights than the other
“literally for ages.” Id. Both theories are problematic if rigidly applied. For
example, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy notes that “the interest
theory is also misaligned with any ordinary understanding of rights.” Id. In any
event, although one could argue that animals have interests and thus should
have some form of “rights” under an expansive view of the interest theory that
goes beyond its usual focus on humans and human proxies, such a conclusion is
not in any way compelled under the theory. See J. Raz, On the Nature of Rights,
93 MIND 194, 204 (1984) (a prominent interest theory proponent noting that
“[t]he definition of rights itself does not settle the issue of who is capable of
having rights beyond requiring that right-holders are creatures who have
interests. What other features qualify a creature to be a potential right-holder is
a question bound up with substantive moral issues.”). Professor Tribe asserts
that even under will theory, which may be viewed as a more restrictive
perspective on the function of rights, it is:
unsustainable to equate legal personhood with rights-holding
because the class of potential rights-holders under that definition
would exclude what our culture universally regards as legal persons.
Needless to say, infant children and comatose adults are
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IV. THE LAVERY II BRIEF FAILS TO RECOGNIZE
THE DISTINCTIVE NATURE OF HUMANS’
CAPACITY TO BEAR LEGAL DUTIES
The most notable distinction between the Lavery II brief
and the Lavery I brief is that the Lavery II brief seeks to utilize
additions to previous expert affidavits and some new expert
affidavits to strengthen the argument already made in the Lavery
I brief that chimpanzees have some sense of moral responsibility
in their relationships.55 This is in response to the Lavery court’s
unanimous decision recognizing that chimpanzees are not
persons in our legal system because they are not capable of
bearing legal duties.56
Whether chimpanzees have some quality that could be
described as a sense of moral responsibility in their relationships
is quite obviously not the pertinent question regarding legal
personhood under our human legal system. Ants, whose ability to
work together for the greater good of their colony is observable
even by non-experts, could probably be described as having
something like a sense of responsibility toward the other ants in
their colony or to the colony as a whole. Across many species of
animals, mothers and, among some species, fathers demonstrate
characteristics that probably could be described in terms of a
sense of responsibility for their young offspring. Perhaps any type
of mature animal that lives cooperatively in some kind of family
paradigmatic legal persons. Yet they certainly do not possess what
will theorists would deem rights.
Tribe Letter Brief, supra note 6, at 9. But this line of argument undervalues
courts’ consistent emphasis on humanity’s centrality to personhood. Our courts
have appropriately recognized that there is something distinctive in humanity.
As discussed above, this perception of distinctiveness may have cultural,
religious or even instinctual foundations, but infants and comatose humans
should also be considered first as humans rather than by their limitations
because they are factually part of society’s community, even if they cannot
themselves act as moral agents. See supra notes 32–47 and accompanying text.
Further, courts of course appropriately do not tend to declare allegiance to
either of these competing academic philosophical theories in addressing rights.
Courts are, to say the least, not rigidly beholden to conflicting academic
philosophical theories.
55. See, e.g., Lavery II Brief, supra note 3, at 16–17. Although the argument
is emphasized less in Lavery I, the Lavery I brief also argues that chimpanzees
have moral agency. See, e.g., Lavery I Brief, supra note 4, at 44.
56. Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 251.
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or group could be described as normally having something like a
sense of responsibility to the other animals in the family or group.
But of course we do not assign legal duties to ants or to any
other nonhuman animals. The pertinent question is not whether
chimpanzees possess anything that could be characterized as a
sense of responsibility, but rather whether they possess sufficient
moral responsibility to be held legally accountable as well as to
possess legal rights under our human legal system. When, in
2012, an adult chimpanzee at the Los Angeles Zoo beat a threemonth-old baby chimpanzee in the head until the baby died,
doubtless no authorities seriously contemplated charging the
perpetrator in criminal court.57 Similarly, when, in 2009, a
chimpanzee attacked a woman in a manner that police described
as “unprovoked” and as “brutal and lengthy,” causing severe, lifethreatening injuries, doubtless no authorities seriously
considered bringing criminal battery charges against the
chimpanzee.58
According to the NhRP website, NhRP President Steven
Wise has a poster at his home office that reads “[w]e may be the
only lawyers on earth whose clients are always innocent.”59 This
makes the point. Our legal system appropriately does not view
chimpanzees as possessing sufficient moral agency to be
accountable under our human legal system. A typical prosecutor
in the United States would not even entertain the idea of seeking
to impose legal responsibilities on chimpanzees based on the
concept of moral responsibility.60 Whether chimpanzees possess
57. Adult Chimpanzee Kills Baby Chimp in Front of Shocked Los Angeles Zoo
Visitors, CBS NEWS (June 27, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/adultchimpanzee-kills-baby-chimp-in-front-of-shocked-los-angeles-zoo-visitors/
[https://perma.cc/AK4E-Z3GS].
58. Stephanie Gallman, Chimp Attack 911 Call: ‘He's Ripping Her Apart’,
CNN (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/02/17/chimpanzee.attack/
index.html?iref=24hours [https://perma.cc/SS3H-MQTJ].
59. Michael Mountain, At Sundance, A Triumph for “Unlocking the Cage”,
NONHUMAN
RIGHTS
PROJECT
(Jan.
29,
2016),
http://
www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2016/01/29/at-sundance-a-triumph-forunlocking-the-cage/ [https://perma.cc/QY9S-ZAJE].
60. Authorities restrain, confine, or even kill chimpanzees and other animals
if they are a threat to humans or to other animals (whether ever killing a violent
chimpanzee is ever appropriate is highly questionable, other than in a situation
involving an imminent and very serious threat where no other options are
available). This is based on a perceived need to protect humans, animals, or
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some degree of a quality that could be described as moral
responsibility is irrelevant; they can only interact with our society
in a manner that suggests they should be legal persons with
rights and duties if they have sufficient moral responsibility to be
held accountable under our laws.
The Lavery II brief also argues that the two law review
articles cited by the Lavery court “merely set forth Professor
Cupp’s personal preference for an exceedingly narrow branch of
philosophical theory of contractualism that arbitrarily excludes
every nonhuman animal, while including every human being, in
support of which he cites no cases.”61 An amicus brief filed
opposing the appeal of Lavery I responded to a similar assertion
by the NhRP that practically no philosophers have supported
“rights for being human” by pointing out “the vast western
philosophical canons to the contrary.”62
But at an even more fundamental level, noting that courts do
not feel bound by strict adherence to academic philosophical
theories would be an understatement. Philosophical theories may
be useful in some endeavors, such as understanding or explaining
the foundations of a society, but abstract theoretical philosophy is
merely a tool at best. Judges seek justice at a broad level
influenced by a multitude of factors, rather than deferring to the
shifting sands of current majority, minority, and majority and
minority branch positions among theoretical academic
philosophers, most of whom have no legal training.
Similarly, my observations and analyses regarding our
society and legal system broadly connecting the concepts of rights
and duties since our foundation as a nation are not a call for
judicial endorsement of any formal academic philosophical
theories—or their branches—in all of their particulars. As
articulated throughout this essay and my other writings, focusing
legal personhood on humans and their proxies among the beings

property, rather than based on a conclusion that the animal is morally
blameworthy.
61. Lavery II Brief, supra note 3, at 76.
62. Brief of Amicus Curiae Bob Kohn Against Issuance of Writ of Habeas
Corpus at 17, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, No. 518336/2014, (N.Y.
App. Div. 2014), http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/
2014/06/16.-Brief-of-amicus-curiae-Bob-Kohn-against-issuance-of-writ-ofhabeas-corpus..pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4SQ-Z6NQ].
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of which we are presently aware is not arbitrary, but rather a
recognition that requiring legal accountability to each other as
the norm in a community of humans is at the core of our human
society and its legal system.
The history of rights expansion has been a history of
focusing on the humanity of those who were previously denied
rights. While there may be no case law before Lavery expressly
rejecting habeas corpus for animals because no reported lawsuits
had previously made such a radical assertion, courts have readily
rejected analogous claims. For example, when a lawsuit was
brought seeking application of the Thirteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States to orcas held in captivity, a
district court dismissed the lawsuit in a short opinion because the
Thirteenth Amendment “applies to persons, [sic] and not to nonpersons such as orcas.”63
Finally, as explained by Justice Jaffe in rejecting Lavery II,
the Lavery II brief and its affidavits fail to provide “any allegation
or ground that is sufficiently distinct from those set forth in the
first petition.”64 An argument that chimpanzees are capable of
bearing some sorts of responsibilities was previously made, albeit
with less emphasis, in the Lavery I brief that was unanimously
rejected in the Lavery appellate decision.65

63. Tilikum ex rel. PETA, Inc. v. Sea World Parks & Entm’t Inc., 842 F.
Supp.2d 1259, 1263 (S.D. Cal. 2012).
64. Order To Show Cause & Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dec. 23, 2015), supra
note 12, at 2.
65. For example, the Lavery I brief stated:
Chimpanzees appear to have moral inclinations and some level of
moral agency; they behave in ways that, if we saw the same thing in
humans, we would interpret as a reflection of moral imperatives
(McGrew Aff. at ¶26). They ostracize individuals who violate social
norms (McGrew Aff. at ¶26). They respond negatively to inequitable
situations, e.g. when offered lower rewards than companions
receiving higher ones, for the same task (McGrew Aff. at ¶26). When
given a chance to play economic games, such as the Ultimatum
Game, they spontaneously make fair offers, even when not obliged to
do so (McGrew Aff. at ¶26).
Lavery I Brief, supra note 4, at 32.
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V. HOW FAR MIGHT ANIMAL PERSONHOOD AND
RIGHTS EXTEND?
The NhRP has stated that a goal of using these lawsuits is
to break through the legal wall between humans and animals.66
But we have no idea how far things might go if the wall comes
down. One might suspect that many advocates would push for
things to go quite far.
As noted above, in the real world, law does not fit perfectly
with any single philosophical theory or other academic theory
because judges must be intensely conscious of the practical, real
world consequences of their decisions. One practical consequence
courts should expect if they break through the legal wall between
animals and humans is the opening of a floodgate of expansive
litigation without a meaningful standard for determining how
many of the billions of animals in the world are intelligent
enough to merit personhood. We should not fool ourselves into
minimizing the implications of these lawsuits by thinking that
they are, in the long run, only about the smartest animals.
How many species get legal personhood based on
intelligence is just the start. Once the wall separating humans
and animals comes down, that could serve as a stepping stone for
many who advocate a focus on the capacity to suffer as a basis for
granting legal personhood. Animal legal rights activists do not all
see eye to eye regarding whether they should focus on seeking
legal standing for all animals who are capable of suffering or on
legal personhood and rights for particularly smart animals like
chimpanzees. However, these approaches may only be different
beginning points with a similar possible end point.
The intelligent animal personhood approach is more
pragmatic in the short term, because the immediate practical
consequences of granting legal standing to all sentient animals
could be immensely disruptive for society.67 We do not have
66. “Our goal is, very simply, to breach the legal wall that separates all
humans from all nonhuman animals.” Michael Mountain, Lawsuit Filed Today
on Behalf of Chimpanzees Seeking Legal Personhood, NONHUMAN RIGHTS
PROJECT (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2013/12/02/
lawsuit-filed-today-on-behalf-of-chimpanzee-seeking-legal-personhood/
[https://perma.cc/6BDE-85B8].
67. See Children & Chimps, supra note 25, at 21. The Manhattan Stanley
ruling asserted in a footnote that “the floodgates argument is not a cogent
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much economic reliance on chimpanzees, there are relatively few
of them in captivity compared to many other animals, and we can
recognize that they are particularly intelligent and closer to
humans than are other animals. Thus, perhaps a court could be
tempted to believe that granting personhood to chimpanzees
would be a limited and manageable change. If that were accepted
as a starting position, there is no clear or even fuzzy view of the
end position. It would at least progress to assertions that most
animals utilized for human benefit have some level of autonomy
interests sufficient to allow them to be legal persons who may
have lawsuits filed on their behalf on that basis. Professor
Richard Epstein has recognized the slipperiness of this slope,
pointing out that “[u]nless an animal has some sense of self, it
cannot hunt, and it cannot either defend himself or flee when
subject to attack. Unless it has a desire to live, it will surely die.
And unless it has some awareness of means and connections, it
will fail in all it does.”68
Opening the personhood door to the more intelligent
animals would also encourage efforts to extend personhood on the
basis of sentience rather than solely seeking extensions based on
autonomy. The implications of much broader potential expansion
of legal personhood based on either autonomy definitions or
sentience could be enormous, and society should carefully think
them through. Any court that contemplates making this
restructuring of our legal system must also contemplate the
practical consequences.

reason for denying relief.” Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Stanley, 16
N.Y.S.3d 898, 917 n.2 (Sup. Ct. 2015). The judge cited Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
570 N.E.2d 198, 204 (N.Y. 1991) (Hancock, J. dissenting), which involved a
proposed tort law expansion. Although no pinpoint citation was provided,
apparently the judge was referencing the dissent in Enright. Id. Interestingly,
the majority opinion in Enright found it appropriate to consider what it viewed
as “staggering implications” of the proposed expansion, and the difficulty, if the
expansion were accepted, “of confining liability by other than artificial and
arbitrary boundaries.” Id. at 201. In the NhRP lawsuits, courts must consider
that there is no basis for determining how far to extend legal personhood among
the world’s billions of animals if personhood is grounded in a vague intelligence
standard.
68. Richard A. Epstein, Animals as Objects, or Subjects, of Rights, in ANIMAL
RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 154 (Cass R. Sunstein &
Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004).
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VI. THE POLITICAL PROCESS IS IMPORTANT IN
ADDRESSING THIS TYPE OF PROPOSED
CHANGE
As noted above, it seems quite likely that Americans will
continue to push for more protections of animals through the
democratic process, and that is a good thing. But of course most
citizens would oppose making animals legal persons, and courts
need to demonstrate restraint and to respect the democratic
process. Courts applying common law do not always need to wait
for legislatures to act, but the more monumental the potential
change, and the more it would violate the views of most citizens,
the more thoughtful courts need to be about whether it is
appropriate for them to make the change.
VII. A FEW WORDS ABOUT THE COMMON LAW WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS IN LAVERY
Professor Tribe has argued that the Lavery appellate court
decision misunderstood the “crucial role” the common law writ of
habeas corpus has historically played in “providing a forum to
test the legality of someone’s ongoing restraint or detention.”69
He also says that it serves as “a crucial guarantor of liberty by
providing a judicial forum to beings the law does not (yet)
recognize as having legal rights and responsibilities on a footing
equal to others.”70
The common law writ of habeas corpus has indeed served
as a vehicle for humans to test the legality of ongoing restraint.
However, humans are not simply “beings,” they are human
beings, and their legal personhood is anchored in the human
community. If habeas corpus jurisdiction were to be granted for
any beings for whom an advocate wished to test the legality of
restraint, would it be available for earthworms restrained in
containers to be sold at gardening stores? If courts began to
broadly allow habeas writs to test the legality of any nonhuman
being’s restraint, and then focused only on the scope of habeas
corpus relief to limit boundaries, they could be flooded with
habeas corpus claims for countless animals.
69. Tribe Letter Brief, supra note 6, at 3.
70. Id. at 4.
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The New York habeas corpus statute states that a “person”
or one acting on the person’s behalf may petition for the writ.71
Thus, the jurisdiction question is related to the ultimate question
of legal personhood under the statute’s language. Boundaries are
needed for jurisdiction as well as for substantive relief, and,
among the beings of which we are presently aware, habeas corpus
should be grounded only in the human community.72
VIII. ANIMAL TRUSTS DO NOT CREATE NEW LEGAL
PERSONS
The Lavery I brief and the Lavery II brief argue that
animals are already recognized as legal persons in New York.
They assert that a New York state statute allowing humans to
create an inter vivos trust for their companion animals or other
animals makes the animals beneficiaries, and that “only ‘persons’
may be trust beneficiaries.”73 But when a state permits people to
create trusts to care for animals, the legislative intent is not to
declare that the animals are now legal persons with autonomy
rights. Rather, the intent is doubtless to give humans peace of
mind in knowing that their beloved animals will be cared for after
they pass away, as well as to facilitate good care for animals.
Further, as explained by New York Assistant Attorney General
Christopher Coulston in opposing this argument in one of the
related chimpanzee cases, elsewhere a New York statute defines
the term “animal,” which is used repeatedly in the companion
animal inter vivo trust statute, as “every living creature except a
human being.”74
71. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7002(a) (MCKINNEY 2012).
72. This is not inconsistent with allowing habeas corpus and personhood for
detainees held by the United States at Guantanamo Bay. See Boumediene v.
Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008). The detainees are human. Although American
courts have in some situations not granted full personhood to some subsets of
humans (such as when the odious practice of slavery was an American
institution), because of personhood’s focus on humanity American courts have
never extended personhood beyond humans and human proxies. See also supra
note 36.
73. Lavery I Brief, supra note 4, at 50; see also Lavery II Brief, supra note 3,
at 72.
74. Respondent’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Petition for a
Writ of Habeas Corpus & in Support of their Cross-Motion to Change Venue to
Supreme Court, Suffolk County at 16, Nonhuman Rights Project v. Stanley, No.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss3/5
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IX. CONCLUSION
Recognizing that personhood is a fit for humans rather
than animals in our legal system does not limit us to considering
animals as “mere things” with the same status as inanimate
objects. “Mere things” do not have laws protecting them. This is
not an argument that we have done enough for animals. Society
is increasingly interested in protecting animals through law, and
we should continue to develop our protections. As noted above, in
some areas, our laws have not yet caught up with our evolving
views on the protection of animals and quite a bit of evolution is
likely still ahead even from an animal welfare perspective.75
Felony animal cruelty statutes provide a hopeful example
of the kind of evolution that we have experienced and likely will
continue to experience without restructuring our legal system to
divorce personhood from humans and human proxies. Twentyfive years ago few states made felony status available for serious
animal cruelty.76 A misdemeanor was the most serious charge
available in most states. However, by 2014, our laws in this area
had dramatically evolved. In that year, South Dakota became the
last of all states to make serious animal cruelty eligible for felony
status.77 We need to continue evolving our legal system like this
to provide more protection to animals where appropriate, not
because animals are legal persons, but because humans need to
be responsible in their treatment of animals.

152736/2015 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 22, 2015) (citing N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 350
(McKinney 2015)), http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/05/Reply-Brief-from-AG-5-22-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8JC-BKE6].
75. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. I argue this point in more
depth and provide suggestions for some types of changes courts and legislatures
should make in framing animals’ property status in More than Mere Things,
supra note 33.
76. The Animal Legal Defense Fund has gathered information about the year
each state adopted felony animal cruelty provisions. See Jurisdictions With
Felony Animal Cruelty Provisions, ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND (Apr. 2012),
http://aldf.org/downloads/Felony_Status_List%204-12.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
YP8L-5EBR] . According to the website’s list, as of 1990, only six states had
adopted felony animal cruelty provisions. Id.
77. South Dakota is Last State to Make Animal Cruelty a Felony, J. AM.
VETERINARY MED. ASS’N NEWS (June 15, 2014), https://www.avma.org/News/
JAVMANews/Pages/140615f.aspx [https://perma.cc/YB7N-AAD4].
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